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EU-EAEU mega deal against the backdrop of a relationship in crisis  
 
Will the idea of an economic integration agreement between the European Union and the 
Eurasian Economic Union ever come to fruition?  
 
At this point, even raising the question seems a non-starter. Relations between the EU and 
Russia – countries that account for 87% of total GDP and a full 75% of the population of the 
EAEU – are in deep crisis. Economic cooperation is being consumed by the current exchange 
of sanctions. Firmly grasping the gravity of the situation, we are reminded of the origins of 
the European Union – and of the discussions that took place in 1944-1945. It was at this time 
that the foundations of European integration were first laid (just as, back in its day, the 
Bretton-Woods system created the present-day structure of trade and financial relations). The 
foundations of the new have frequently been laid in times of crisis. Who would have thought 
back in 1944 that in just ten short years, the European Community would start to take on 
tangible forms?  
 
Country leaders and officials are already expressing their support for the idea of ‘European-
Eurasian’ economic integration. The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir. Putin, put 
forward a proposal to begin consideration of the idea of a free-trade zone with the EU at the 
EU-Russia summit held on 28 January 2014. On 5 February, the proposal was embraced by 
the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev. By 12 September, we were hearing words 
of official support for free-trade negotiations from the European Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Štefan Füle. According to Füle, the time has come for 
the establishment of official ties at the level of the two unions – the European and the 
Eurasian – with a view to starting the negotiation process. The Europeans are coming to the 
realization that the problem of Eastern partnership cannot be solved without Russian 
participation. Moreover, a new entity has arisen that must be dealt with – the EAEU 
(heretofore, the EU had been blatantly ignoring both the Customs Union and the Eurasian 
Economic Commission for years). On the other hand, there’s always a fly in the ointment: 
Füle’s term in office is swiftly coming to an end.  
 
An economic integration agreement between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic 
Union has been under discussion by the expert community for several years now. From 
among the most recent works on the subject, particularly noteworthy are the report by the 
Center for Integration Studies at the Eurasian Development Bank Quantitative Analysis of 
Economic Integration between the EU and the EAEU: Methodological Approaches (April 
2014) and the report Deadlock of Integrations’ Struggle in Europe, published in May 2014 
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under the auspices of the Committee for Civic Initiatives. Today, the future of ‘European-
Eurasian’ relations must be regarded in a new light, against the backdrop of deep crisis, in 
view of EAEU establishment and in the most practical way possible.  
 
The main thesis of this article is that, due to the sheer scope of related issues, the anticipated 
agreement – or set of agreements – must be framed as a “mega deal”. Mutual concessions and 
compromises will be necessarily interconnected. The importance of various domains will be 
different for both parties. Deferring in one area, the partner will expect a “trade-off” with 
respect to another problem. While not claiming to be exhaustive or conclusive, listed below 
are 19 substantive questions forming the possible negotiation agenda.  
 
It could fairly be assumed that the work ahead will be long, hard, and dotted by moments 
when it seems that the outlook for reaching the finish line is grim. But there are chances for 
success. A key question in this context, of course, is the position taken by the U.S. – a country 
clearly unenthusiastic about the prospects of a mega deal between the EU and the EAEU. 
Finding common ground with American interests is a separate topic – one of critical 
importance to the success of our project, but nevertheless beyond the scope of this short 
article.  
 
In our opinion, the problem of shared neighborhood could be addressed by a long-term 
framework solution within the scope of the anticipated integration agreement. At issue here, 
first and foremost, are Ukraine and Moldova, though Georgia and Azerbaijan are certainly on 
the agenda as well. Among these four countries the status quo is acceptable only for 
Azerbaijan as long as the relatively benign oil and gas pricing persists. The economic 
potential of Georgia and Moldova will be substantially lower. Finally, in the Ukrainian case 
there is no viable alternative whatsoever. Last three countries of our shared neighborhood are 
the most directly invested in an EU-EAEU mega deal – in its absence, they will be unable to 




In 2003–2004, the issue of economic cooperation and integration between the European 
Union and the Russian Federation was of great common interest. Yet, negotiations on an EU-
Russia common space hit an impasse, with the topic relegated to the back burner soon 
thereafter. Nevertheless, the foundation for mutual interest in the project objectively exists: it 
is based on territorial proximity, significant trade flows, potential investment ties, issues of 
economic security, the EAEU’s interest in the transfer of European technology, outstanding 
issues of the development of cross-border infrastructure, and the presence of common 
contiguous states.  
 
For the emerging Eurasian Economic Union, close economic cooperation with the EU is of 
critical importance:  
 The EU is the largest trading partner of both Russia and Kazakhstan, accounting for 
more than half of the Russian Federation’s total trade turnover (while Russia is the third-
largest trading partner of the European Union). 
 The EU could play a key role in addressing CU-country modernization issues.  
 The emerging Eurasian Economic Union is currently initiating a series of free-trade 
agreements with partners of lesser importance in terms of economic size and overall 
significance, such as Vietnam and Israel. Yet, the very fact of these negotiations is beneficial: 
they help clarify priorities, shape areas of expertise and polish negotiating tactics. At the same 
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time, it is precisely the European Union that should be viewed as the main long-term partner 
in this context.  
 The Ukrainian problem can only be resolved within the scope of deep economic 
cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, which only serves to 
underscore the importance of this cooperation.  
 
For the EU, close economic cooperation with the EAEU is also of fundamental importance:  
 The EAEU is the European Union’s third-largest trading partner after the U.S. and 
China. The impact of Russian restrictions on food imports clearly demonstrates the 
current level of trade interdependence and the interest European manufacturers and 
farmers have in normal commercial relations.  
 Security issues, including those of our shared neighborhood, can only be addressed 
within the scope of cooperation with EAEU countries.  
 Ongoing structural dependence on “Eurasian” hydrocarbons.  
 In general, the free trade regime with the EAEU will provide the EU producers with an 
opportunity not only to strengthen their competitiveness on this important market but 
also to enhance terms of trade on the markets adjacent to the Eurasian Union. The 
combination of the EU and EAEU competitive advantages will create a change to 
realize the ‘double rent’ – both technological rent for the EU and the resource rent for 
its Eurasian counterpart. This will lead to higher competitiveness of all economies 
adjacent to the Lisbon to Vladivostok framework.  
 
Growing trend of global interregionalism   
 
Over the past two decades, interest in regional integration has spiked, spurring an increase in 
the number of newly created regional trading agreements. Regionalism has emerged as the 
dominating factor in the development of global trade, investments and labor flows. It has a 
tremendous impact on both economic and political relations between individual countries, 
prompting them to face some critical questions: Which trading block should we join? Which 
form of integration would be the most preferable? Which authorities should be transferred to 
the supranational level? Which institutions are most aligned with our national interests? 
 
The number of regional trade agreements (RTA) has risen sharply. As of early 2014, the WTO 
had received 583 notifications on the creation of goods-and-services RTA – 377 of which have 
already come into force. The EU has served notice of the creation of 47 RTA, while the U.S. 
is a party to a total of 14 RTA, Japan – 17, Chile – 24, China – 15, and Brazil – 4. According 
to the WTO database,
 
most of the RTA created around the world involve the establishment of 
free-trade zones, with only 17 classified as customs unions. That said, only six CU are 
actually functioning, and only three of those are full-fledged customs unions (EU, EU–Turkey 
and the CU of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia). The rest, including MERCOSUR and the 
South African Customs Union, have an exemption rate from the common customs tariff of 
30% or higher.  
 
The ascendance of regionalism has been predicated on a number of factors. In particular, it 
has been associated with the fact that progress within the scope of WTO rounds has been 
painfully slow – namely the Doha round. Then the “domino effect” came into play: countries 
started coming to the conclusion that the costs of remaining on the sidelines of trade-and-
economic unions might be higher than the costs of joining. Nevertheless, the overall desire of 
individual countries to form RTA is primarily prompted by their desire to stimulate economic 
growth by taking advantage of the many opportunities offered to members: improved market 
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access, economies of scale, attraction of foreign direct investments (FDI), technology transfer, 
and so on.  
 
At present, the various forms of economic integration are constantly evolving – becoming 
more sophisticated and mutually complementary. For instance, a free trade zone and customs 
union can encompass elements of higher levels of integration, namely: a reduction in non-
tariff barriers, the removal of restrictions on trade in services, capital movement and labor 
flows, dispute-resolution mechanisms, trade facilitation policies, protectionary measures, and 
the creation of institutional mechanisms, etc. This is associated with the growing 
understanding that, from the standpoint of economic impact, the elimination of trade barriers 
alone is likely to have much fewer positive effects than deeper integration.  
 
There are several stages of trade liberalization and a whole range of different integration 
models. The first model – that of bilateral free-trade agreements concluded between two 
national economies – can be relatively straightforward. Most agreements of this kind deal 
only with free trade in goods, a significant share add free trade in services, and only a few aim 
for the more ambitious goal of the establishment of customs unions.  
 
The second model involves the formation of integrated regional blocks, the prime example of 
which is the European Union. In South America, the Mercosur group made an attempt to form 
a robust customs union, but its trade policy still contains numerous exemptions and has 
effectively stalled. A valiant attempt was made by the 10-member ASEAN group in South-
East Asia, but it still does not constitute a customs union. The North American Free-Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico represents yet another 
regional integration initiative, but it is quite loose in terms of member integration and is 
similarly not a customs union. From among the more recent examples, the Customs Union of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia is the dynamic stand-out.  
 
The third model – interregional integration agreements – features a number of different 
variants. The most impressive of these are intercontinental initiatives, of which only two are 
currently up and running. The first is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), uniting the bulk of 
East and South-East Asia and the Pacific West Coast, with the exception of China. The 
second initiative is the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), negotiations 
on which are currently underway between the United States and the European Union. The 
subject of lively discussion, the TTIP is aiming at greater convergence on regulatory matters, 
which lies well beyond the scope of routine free trade pursuits.  
 
Work on both the TPP and the TTIP is still ongoing. Both initiatives aim at the sweeping 
liberalization of a high volume of global trade in the regions of the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans, while the anticipated degree of their integration is both comprehensive and deep. Yet, 
experts believe that the Trans-Pacific initiative’s chances of success are minimal, since the 
structure is simply too loose. On the other hand, the outlook for the Euro-American TTIP is 
formidable. These integration processes, should they come to fruition, will have a powerful 
impact on the world economy and global trade and investments. At their core lies the 
potential for at least an erosion – and quite possibly a partial replacement – of the 
contemporary WTO regime. 
 
Another variation on the theme of potential interregionalism (and one that entails the most 
complex negotiations) is offered by inter-block agreements. There have been no such 
precedents thus far. The European Union is attempting to conduct negotiations with 
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Mercosur, but is swiftly coming to the conclusion that the week internal cohesiveness among 
Mercosur members is problematic and a complicating factor in the overall process. At the 
same time, it is precisely this form of inter-regionalism that is most likely to play an 
increasing role, making the system of global trade and investments even more multilayered 
and intricate. 
 
Features and Contents of the EU-EAEU Mega Deal  
 
The EU-EAEU mega deal assumes exactly this idea of an interregional integration agreement 
that unites two blocks. It is a new idea, which means it is particularly complicated. What 
might be the main characteristics of this agreement?   
 
First, the party to the mega deal, irrespective of the legal form it might take, would be not 
Russia but the Eurasian Economic Union, by virtue of its supranational authority. National 
representatives (the relevant departments of economic ministries, foreign affairs ministries, 
etc.), would certainly be present at and, at the decisive stage – influence the course of –  
negotiations and final agreements, but these negotiations would formally be led by the EEC. 
This is an important nuance – just as new and unfamiliar to the participants of the Eurasian 
integration process as it would be to the European Union.   
 
Second, EAEU member states would be interested not merely in a free trade agreement per se 
but in a deep and comprehensive agreement with the European Union. The motivation is 
quite simple: a “bare-bones” free-trade zone is not advantageous to either Russia or 
Kazakhstan, both of whose exports encompass primarily raw materials. Due to their current 
trade structure, Russia and Kazakhstan would have little interest in a narrowly defined free-
trade regime with the EU (this holds true for Belarus as well, though to a lesser extent). That 
said, obvious problems in the realm of trading concessions would have to be offset by gains in 
other areas. Significant progress is needed in other areas of economic cooperation in order for 
the idea to become truly viable.  
 
Third, the prototypes of such an agreement between the EU and the EAEU encompassing the 
broad swath of pertinent issues are numerous and diverse – from a deep and comprehensive 
free-trade agreement (DCFTA) to a comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA). 
The latter is in fact the legal form of the agreement in principle reached between the EU and 
Canada in 2013. СЕТА and the aforementioned US-EU Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) could fairly be viewed as particularly instructive prototypes for the EU-
EAEU mega deal. 
 
Fourth, it should be noted that full-fledged negotiations between the EU and the EAEU will be 
impossible without the WTO membership of all member states of the Eurasian Economic 
Union. Consequently, Russia should lend its full support to Kazakhstan and particularly 
Belarus in their negotiations with Geneva. Russia should become the driver of both countries’ 
ascension to the WTO.  
 
However, this WTO membership depends not only on the EU or even Russia but to a great 
extent on the position taken by the United States. In the U.S., the relationship with Russia 
falls within the realm of internal politics and squabbles between the country’s two main 
political parties, and that is where it is likely to remain. No swift improvements should be 
expected: suffice it to recall the Jackson-Vanik amendment, whose repeal with respect to 
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Russia took more than 20 years (while it continues to remain in force in the case of both 
Belarus and Kazakhstan).  
 
A separate question which demands for an answer is how the EU-US TTIP regulations will 
coincide with the norms of the prospective EU-EAEU deal.  
 
Fifth, the scope of potential issues that could be addressed by the mega deal (whether it takes 
the form of a single agreement or set of agreements) encompasses dozens of items. Here are 
but a few of them:   
 
1. Trade in goods (abolishment of import duties with a clearly-defined set of 
exemptions). 
2. Elimination/streamlining of non-tariff trade barriers. 
3. Regulation of cross-border electronic trade.  
4. Trade in services.  
5. Liberalization of access to financial markets. 
6. Free capital movement.  
7. Regulatory convergence (norms and standards). 
8. Intellectual property rules.   
9. Reciprocal recognition of diplomas (degrees), including in terms of professional 
education.   
10. Vise free regime, including a set of agreements on readmission.  
11. Special regime for Kaliningrad Region (investment or trade-and-investment). 
12. Special neighborhood regions.  
13. Mass educational exchanges (Erasmus Mundus, and so forth). 
14. Application of the EU’s Third Energy Package to projects envisioning Russian gas 
exports. 
15. Development of international transport infrastructure (road and rail corridors).  
16. Establishment of an EU-EAEU common electric power market.  
17. Regulation of partial reciprocal access to public procurements.  
18. Competition rules.  
19. Dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
Sixth, according to the baseline scenario, work on the agreement will take several years, 
while the comprehensive agreement itself could be concluded sometime in the 2020s.  
 
Determination of the desirable or even possible date of agreement conclusion necessarily 
entails the use of two approaches. The first stems from EAEU countries’ need to modernize. 
In their recent article in Eurasian Economic Integration magazine, A. Shirov and A. 
Yantovsky tackle the question of determining the possible timeframe for the creation of a 
free-trade zone between the two integrated blocks. They proceed from the following basic 
argument: at present, free trade would be disadvantageous for EAEU countries by virtue of 
the low competitiveness of Eurasian manufacturers and high barriers to the EU markets due to 
discrepancies in technological standards (as opposed to import duties). Modernization efforts 
inside the EAEU, combined with positive forecasts for the heightened efficiency of primary-
resource use and growth in manufacturing productivity, lead the authors to settle on 2021-
2024 as the earliest possible date for an FTA.  
 
We share this opinion, in due consideration of various technical factors. Even after the 
tentative abatement of the Ukrainian crisis and the first advent of an opportunity to commence 
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substantive negotiations, for purely technical reasons (predicated on the extreme complexity 
and sheer scope of related issues), talks are bound to take at least several years. Clearly, these 
negotiations promise to be anything but easy. A realistic estimate of the duration of EU-
EAEU negotiations would be 5 to 8 years. In order to have a chance at toasting a signed 
agreement in the mid-2020s, it is vital to sit down to the negotiating table as soon as the 
political situation allows. In the meantime, it is the job of the expert community and the 
concerned state bodies to get down to the work of determining the prospective agenda and 
prerequisites for future negotiations right now.  
 
